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A Model for B2B IT Security: Multilayer Defense Facing 
Interdependent Cyber Risk 
 Tridib Bandyopadhyay 




B2B firms couple their business processes for better efficiency. Integrated Business processes require that the firms’ 
networks be interconnected. This practice enables breach incidence to travel from one firm to another, making the IT security 
risks of the firms strategically interdependent. The present practice of multilayered defense against IT breaches resembles 
stage-gates, bringing operational interdependency between the successive layers of defense in a B2B firm. Such inter-firm 
and inter-layer interdependences in B2B relationship ultimately results in complex decision scenarios in the IT security 
regime. We propose a comprehensive game theoretic model to capture the above complex, intertwined interdependencies of 
IT security risk in B2B firms. We also provide some initial results to explain the B2B firms’ incentive to invest in IT security. 
Keywords  
IT Security, IT Security Investment, Game Theoretic Approach, B2B IT Security, Multilayer IT Security Defense  
1. INTRODUCTION  
Firms have been engaging in B2B relationships since quite some time now. Process integration, leading to gains in efficiency 
and increased cost effectiveness have remained the predominant driving forces. Of late, such motivation is further 
strengthened by the Internet technologies, which provide a cost effective networking option between B2B firms. Small and 
medium firms, which earlier found the costs of EDI networking technologies daunting, have now engaged in numerous B2B 
relationships with the help of the Internet based open standard technologies. Although inter-firm networking does bring 
business value, firms must also be aware of the cyber risks that can be propagated across the B2B firms with the help of these 
network interconnectivities. Since cyber risks are more likely to propagate over the open standard based Internet technologies 
than the proprietary EDI technologies, firms who engage in the Internet based B2B networking need to be especially careful 
about the interdependency in IT security risks that ensue. Importantly, this interdependency potentially impacts the 
motivation of the other interconnected firm to secure its own perimeter from the general web traffic. After all, if Firm-1 is not 
careful about its incoming web traffic, the trusted B2B connectivity that it maintains with Firm-2 is exposed to the rogue 
elements that may manage to filter through the porous perimeter security of firm-1. As a result, B2B firms’ IT security 
initiatives become quite interdependent on each other (Bandyopadhyay et. al. 2010). While the strategic IT security 
interdependency remains a major concern for the B2B firms, there is yet another aspect of operational dependency that must 
be managed by a typical firm (including a B2B firm) in its IT security Domain.  
Although researchers and practitioners have urged firms to manage their IT security risks in myriad ways (for a refresher, see 
Whitman et. al. 2010), one common theme that is widely accepted in IT security is the concept of ‘defense in layers’. Firms 
today secure their network perimeters with the firewall technology to keep unwanted traffic out (prevention regime), yet 
implement Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in order to track and monitor filtered external traffic as well as the internal 
traffic (detection regime). Although effective, such layered approach is challenging in terms of the joint implementation, 
since the mutual configuration of the layers must ensure optimal balance between the needs of access control and information 
asset protection. The basic challenge arises from the fact that the layers of IT security defense somewhat resemble the 
sequenced stage-gates of a statistically controlled process. For example, if a firm employs a large cache of firewall rules, the 
firewall becomes very restrictive. As a result, the incidence rate on the IDS – the relative proportion of the rogue traffic in the 
filtered output from the firewall- sharply drops. This in turn, affects the statistical errors (the false positive and false negative 
ratios) of the IDS, thereby necessitating changes in the alarm investigation strategies of the defending firm! In other words, 
the configuration and the sensitivities of the layers of IT security defense are required to be in tune with one another in order 
to ensure an effective overall IT security defense. Proper mutual configuration cannot be overemphasized - under certain 
conditions; a firm with sub-optimally configured layered IT security defense may even do worse than the case where it 
employs only one of the IT security layers without the other (Cavusoglu et. al. 2009)! 
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The above sets of interdependencies, one from the strategic inter-firm B2B relationship and the other arising out of the need 
for operational configurations between the layers of technology in IT security, give rise to one challenging research question: 
Given that (1) a typical firm must manage the operational interdependency between the layered IT security defenses, and that 
(2) the B2B firms experience strategic interdependency between their IT security risks, How do the incentives of strategic IT 
security investment play out between the B2B firms? 
In this work, we attempt to seek answer to the above research question from a strategic view point. We propose a game 
theoretic model that comprehensively captures the interdependencies in IT security as faced by a modern B2B firm. The 
players in the proposed model are the defenders in IT security, namely the B2B firms. However, IT security defense must 
also be appropriately reactive to the Hackers, who are regarded as strategic in their actions. Thus, strategic hacking attacks 
are anticipated, and captured in our model in response to the relative IT security levels of the B2B firms. In order to keep the 
analytics tractable between the nested interdependencies of layered IT security defense within B2B relationship, we model a 
simple scenario where a unique hacker attacks one of the two symmetric B2B firms in the system. The contributions of this 
work are (a) we provide a game theoretic model for the layered IT security defense in B2B relationship and (b) we reconcile 
inter-firm strategic interdependencies and intra-firm operational interdependencies of layered IT security defense in a unique 
framework. To the best of our knowledge, neither of the above has been done before. Significantly, our work conjoins 
paradigms of IT security decisions that encompass multiple firms each securing its IT assets in a layered approach.  
In what follows, we first provide a brief literature review in section-2 before we present our model and analyze some 
preliminary results of the model in section-3. We present our concluding thoughts and future research in section-4. This work 
is currently at an initial phase, and our emphasis in the paper have been on rationalizing the model scenario, capturing the 
risks of interdependency in B2B relationship and propose a model that abstracts realities of IT security defense in B2B yet 
retains analytical tractability and suggest managerial insights. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This work relates to the interdependence of IT security in firms and also to the theme of layered defense in IT security. We 
thus briefly provide reviews for the closely related literature in either of the above areas. Researchers in the economics of 
information systems literature have addressed investments in IT security. Gordon and Loeb (2002) have analyzed how 
vulnerabilities in IT security influence defending firms’ investments. Their results have been later qualified and corroborated 
by Tanaka et. al.,(2005). Coming from the point of view that IT security in connected firms could be explained in the light of 
private provisioning of public goods, Varian (2002) has isolated the existence of free rider behavior in defending firms in the 
IT security arena. Kunreuther and Heal (2003) have also analyzed the interdependence between defending firms’ IT security, 
and have further characterized firms’ free rider behavior. Hausken (2006) has modeled the IT security investments as a 
resultant from the impacts of the defending firms’ mutual interdependence, income, and substitution effects. Ogut et al. 
(2005) have differentiated IT security investments between technological and financial approaches and have shown general 
complementarities between these instruments. Bohme et. al. (2006) have shown that correlated cyber risks can create 
deficiencies in the supply side of financial instruments to manage cyber risks.  Bandyopadhyay et. al. (2010) have modeled 
strategic decisions in the IT security defense of supply chain firms, who share information assets to mutual benefits. While 
Cavusoglu et. al. (2004) have analyzed the aspects of investments in IT security in the layers of Firewall and IDS 
technologies, Whitman et. al. (2010) have discussed the overall benefits of utilizing the layers of defense in IT security. In a 
late work, Cavusoglu et. al. (2009) have analyzed the interdependencies of configuration between the IDS and Firewall 
technologies and have noted the benefits of mutually optimal configurations between these technologies in layered IT 
security. In a sense, our present work brings the strategic framework and backgrounds from Bandyopadhyay et. al. (2010) 
and combines them with the intra-firm operational interdependencies of Cavusoglu (2009). 
3. THE MODEL AND ANALYSIS 
Our game theoretic model is set up in the backdrop of a B2B relationship between two Firms.  
Each of the B2B firms, }2,1{, iFi , has information asset which is the target of a hacker. In order to compromise an 
information asset, the hacker must penetrate the perimeter security of a firm who owns the information asset. Each firm 
employs firewall technology to keep unauthorized entry to its network to a minimum level. Other things remaining same, a 
higher investment (x) in firewall technology (FW) reduces the probability (p) that the hacker will be able to breach the 
perimeter security ( 0)('',0)(' ii xpxp ).  
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Each firm also employs IDS technology to monitor traffic inside its perimeter. If a hacker circumvents the perimeter security 
of a firm, it can be detected by the IDS technology with a success factor (d), which however depends on the commitment
1
 (y) 
of the firm. Standard concavity assumptions in firm commitments on the IDS technologies apply ( 0)('',0)(' ii ydyd ).  
The B2B firms share a dedicated interconnectivity. If the hacker gets inside the perimeter of a firm, it can then successively 
utilize this inter-firm connectivity to reach the other firm with a probability (q), whose magnitude depends on the utilized 
technology for inter-firm networking technology and is assumed independent of the detection of the hacking activity by the 
first firm. 
A breach into a firm brings loss }2,1{, iLi . Detection does not completely obviate loss but is assumed to attenuate the loss 
by a factor ( 10, ii ), since such detection may occur after the hacker has been able to access the information asset. If a 




i1 ) to account for the business embarrassment and other compensation requirements, if any.  
The hacker’s action (H) is implicitly strategic in the way it selects the target. By the processes of foot printing, fingerprinting 
and port scanning, the hacker is assumed to form an appreciation of the perimeter security of the firms, and targets that firm 
which has the lower level of perimeter security arrangements. The probability of an attack on firm 1 is denoted by
0',0'),,( )()(21 21 xx ssxxss
. For our 2-firm system, the probability of an attack on firm B is thus given by (1-s).   
The contingency tree of the breach scenario in the B2B including the losses to the firms 1 and 2 is presented below. 
H
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Figure-1 Scenario with attendant losses 
3.1 The Model 
The probability that Firm-1 enjoys freedom from any direct or indirect breach is given by
2
))1(1)(1( 21 psqsp . Thus 
the probability that there is at least a direct or indirect breach into Firm-1 is given by: ))1(1)(1(1 21 psqsp .  
Consequently, the Expected loss to Firm-1 is given by: 
111111211 )1())1(1)(1(1 LdLdpsqsp .
 
 Finally, F-1 solves the following problem to optimally select its investments and commitments in the IT security defense:  
                                                          
1
 Such commitments come in the forms of managerial and technical investigation of alarms on top of the technological finding aspects including 
procurement, update and and management of IDS equipment, breach signatures, employee enablement and other authorization structures. 
2
 For brevity, we write p(x1) = p1, d(y1) = d1 etc. 
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3.2 Analysis of the Overall Breach Probabilities 
Before we analyze the model, we investigate the overall breach probabilities of the firms. Since the probabilities of attack (s), 
probability of success in breaching the firewall (p), and the probability of cross-firm breach propagation (q) are each only a 
small fraction, we ensure simplicity of analysis by ignoring multiplicative terms involving 3 or more of these 
variables/parameters. As we exhibit in (i) through (iii), the movement of the breach probability with the investments in 






















. By similar treatment to the analog of (1), it is 























is inconclusive since 
although 0' )( 2xs , 0'2p . Observation-1 is in order now: 
 
Observation-1: Investment in its own firewall decreases overall breach probability of the same firm. However, the same 











iii , prompting the following observation: 
 
Observation-2: The overall breach probability of either firm (similar analysis for firm-2 yields identical results) 
consistently increases in the inter-firm breach probability q. 
 
3.3 Analysis of the Model 
Now we proceed to the analysis of the Objective function (OF). First note that by our existing concavity assumptions and 
construction of the model, 0',',0',';0',0' 2121)()( 21 ddppss xx
































In order to garner meaningful insights yet keep the analytics simple, we impose symmetric conditions between the B2B 
firms, and investigate the simultaneous Nash equilibrium investments of the B2B firms: 
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First note (4) and see that if the investment in IDS y goes up in equilibrium, the detection rate d increases, which in turn 
increases )('
*
11 xp . However, this is also tantamount to a decrease in investment in the firewall x in the equilibrium, since 
.0)(' xp Now consider (5). If investment in firewall x goes up in equilibrium, then the probability of direct breach p falls 
and the magnitude of the acceleration in detection )('
*
11 yd increases, which is equivalent to a decrease in the investment in 
the IDS (i.e., y) in the simultaneous Nash equilibrium. This leads to our Observation-3 below: 
 
Observation-3: Investment in firewall and IDS technologies act as strategic substitutes for a firm in B2B relationship 
which employs layered defense strategy in IT security.  
As we have already mentioned, one important characterization of the B2B scenario today is the deployment of open standard 
networking technologies to save cost while engaging in multiple relationships in a scalable and interoperable fashion. We 
have also alluded to the fact that these technologies are inherently less secure than the proprietary technologies like the EDI 
technology. As such these technologies are vendor specific and offer only some degree of security proofing. Consequently, it 
is important for us to investigate how the IT security health of the interconnecting technology affects the motivation of 
investment of the B2B firms in firewall and IDS technologies. 
  
Since we allow both the investments in firewall and IDS to vary simultaneously on the vulnerability of the interconnecting 
technology, we first present the Hessian conditions of the objective function Ω before we present the full differentials of the 
layered investments of the B2B firms. Note that we have omitted the mathematical derivations for paucity of space, and have 
presented only the final expressions below.  
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Note that the denominator of the differentials is negative (vide the Hessian conditions).  
 
Observations-4 and 5 are in order now: 
 
Observation-4: Facing increased vulnerability in the interconnecting technology, a B2B firm’s equilibrium investment in 
firewall decreases in presence of IDS technology as an integral part of its layered defense strategy in IT security.  
The above observation is disturbing. It is easy to see that an increased vulnerability in networking technology increases 
breach probability B (x1, x2) and if this now prompts a decrease in the equilibrium investment in firewall technology in 
presence of IDS, the B2B firm’s IT security posture stands to suffers seriously!  
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)'( 2 , else its investment in IDS technology increases in presence of firewall technology.  
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS:  
Beginning with a simple 2-firm contingency tree of IT security breach, we have developed a game theoretic model to 
examine how firms in a B2B relationship, who face network vulnerability in terms of cross propagation of breach incidence 
from one firm to another, may react in terms of their investments in the layered IT defense strategies. The relationships thus 
explored suggest deep complexity and interdependence in IT risk between the B2B firms, which we have presented in the 
numerous observations in the analysis section. We have attempted to capture two recent phenomena of B2B landscape, 
namely the widespread business process integration especially in the SME segment, and the current trend to implement cost 
effective B2B networking solutions which operate on the Internet. Since the benefits are compelling and the vendors promote 
their B2B networking solutions aggressively, these cost effective technologies exhibit great patronage. Our analysis shows 
that these B2B firms need to be careful when they decide on such products, services and relationships. Understanding and 
reacting to the strategic IT risks of B2B relationship, especially when the firms also employ layered IT defense strategy, 
appears to be a challenging task. Our model is a modest attempt to help such understanding processes towards better 
management of IT security risk in B2B relationship. This research is in an initial stage of development. Our model is well 
thought out, and the primary analysis of the model appears promising. Our future goal is analyze the complex risks and 
investment strategies in a threadbare fashion, and provide complete analysis of the model. Although we have analyzed 
simultaneous investment strategies of the firms here, the analysis can also be extended for sequential or Stackelberg type 
games, which are appropriate for B2B relationships that exhibit leader-follower structures or Hub-and-spoke topologies. Our 
work can also be extended for cases, where the leadership structure in a B2B relationship may shoulder the responsibility to 
implement and manage a centrally optimized multilayer IT defense regime.  
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